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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has sought to stabilize the former communist countries 
by encouraging them to transform into fully fledged Western style democracies and 
consolidated market economies (Vachudova, 2005;  Grabbe, 2006). The prospect of 
membership provided the EU with a powerful tool to shape the path of their political and 
economic transition. Yet, accession appears to have been both a blessing and a curse to 
countries aspiring to become members of the European Union. On the one hand, the 
implementation of the acquis supports their transformation from authoritarian regimes with 
state controlled economies into liberal democracies with market economies. On the other 
hand, accession countries face great difficulties in restructuring their economic and political 
institutions in order to meet the conditions for EU membership. The adoption of and 
adaptation to the acquis run into serious problems concerning both the effectiveness and the 
legitimacy of EU policies. Since these countries are “weak” states that often lack the 
absorption capacity rather than the willingness to effectively implement EU policies, accession 
problems cannot simply be solved in the “shadow of hierarchy”, i.e. by the threat of command 
and control legislation. 
 
Accession countries in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe have to adopt the entire set 
of governance institutions enshrined in the Copenhagen criteria and acquis communautaire. 
But the EU also seeks to export the respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law to 
countries that have no membership perspective, at least not in the near future (Börzel, Pamuk 
and Stahn, 2007). Eastern enlargement has stretched the EU’s backyard considerably toward 
the East. Ukraine, and some of the other Newly Independent States have been admitted to the 
club of “close friends” (Magen, 2006;  Tocci, 2007), which already included the EU’s 
neighbours in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East (Bicchi, 2006; Gomez, 2003). 
In order to turn the “ring of friends” in an area of security, stability, and prosperity, the EU 
seeks to foster the approximation of its Southern and Eastern neighbours with key parts of the 
acquis (Lavenex, 2004; Magen and Morlino, 2008).  
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New modes of governance seem to be particularly appropriate for the study of the EU’s 
attempts to Europeanize accession and neighbourhood countries. On the one hand, the EU is 
unable to hierarchically impose the acquis communautaire on accession and neighbourhood 
countries. Before they join, their relationship with the EU remains in the realm of classic 
diplomacy and international negotiations. The EU’s supranational institutions do not cast a 
shadow of hierarchy, since the supremacy of EU law and its direct effect, which empower 
domestic courts to enforce EU Law without the consent of national governments, only take 
effect after accession. On the other hand, accession and neighbourhood countries have been 
limited in their capacity to hierarchically coordinate their approximation to the acquis. The 
adoption of and adaptation to the acquis communautaire has created an enormous policy 
load, which met with limited resources (expertise,  money, personnel) that were already 
strained by managing the transition from authoritarian and socialist rule, respectively. Given 
the limited capacity of both the EU and the accession and neighbourhood countries, it would 
be only rational for public actors, both at the European and the national level, to seek the 
cooperation with non-state actors to share or shift the burden by pooling resources and 
delegating certain tasks. Non-state actors, in turn, could exchange their resources for 
influence on policies which would significantly affect them. Finally, the European 
Commission has strongly encouraged accession countries to involve non-state actors in the 
adoption of and adaptation to the acquis to ensure both greater effectiveness and legitimacy of 
the accession process (Tulmets, 2005). In other words, the accession and approximation of 
Southern and Eastern neighbours to the EU appear to be most likely cases for the emergence 
of new modes of governance.  
 
This paper focuses on new modes of governance in the EU’s attempts to impact upon states, 
which are not (yet) members and which have become members in the 1980s. More 
specifically, I seek to explore the role of new modes of governance for the implementation of 
EU policies and EU primary Law in  different types of states, “weak states” in particular, 
including Southern European member states, CEE candidate countries and associated states 
in the former Soviet Union and Northern Africa. To what extent have new modes of Working Paper No: 01/2011    Page 6 of 37 
governance helped weak states that lack sufficient capacities to adopt and implement domestic 
reforms to comply with EU norms and rule cope with the challenge of accession and 
approximation to the EU? 1
 
 
The paper will start with definition of new modes of governance as they are employed by the 
EU to facilitate the adoption of and adaptation to EU policies and EU Law in countries with 
weak state capacities. The following sections will explore the emergence, evolution, execution, 
effectiveness and legitimacy of new modes of governance as well as their structural impact on 
accession and neighbourhood countries. The paper concludes with some policy implications 
regarding (new modes of) governance and accession. I will show that new modes of 
governance can help bring countries closer to Europe. Yet, they do so only if both state and 
non-state actors have sufficient capacities and trust each other. Given that these conditions are 
often absent in accession and neighbourhood countries, we should caution our expectations 
in new modes of governance and focus on less innovative means, such as capacity-building. 
 
                                            
1 This paper summarizes the findings of the Research Cluster “Effectiveness, Capacity and Legitimacy” of the 
Integrated Project ‘New Modes of Governance in Europe’, funded by the 6th Framework Programme of the 
European Union and coordinated by the European University Institute http://www.eu-newgov.org/, last access: 5 
January 2011). I thank Adrienne Héritier, Martin Rhodes, Gerda Falkner and the anonymous reviewer for their 
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2. THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE: SEEK AND YE 
SHALL FIND? 
Defining new modes of governance is not an easy task. What may be old in the EU 15 may 
appear rather new to the accession and neighbourhood countries, which just regained their 
sovereignty and have never experienced supranational forms of governance, such as the 
Community Method. 
 
In order not to limit our analytical focus too much, I adopt a broader understanding of new 
modes of governance. We define them as structures and processes of coordination that aim at 
adopting and implementing political decisions (governance) and that: 
 
1.  are non-hierarchical, i.e. each actor involved has a formal or de facto veto in decision-
making and complies voluntarily, respectively, and/or 
2.  systematically involve non-state actors, for profit (e.g. firms) and/or not for profit (e.g. 
non-governmental organizations) in policy formulation and/or implementation. 
 
While this definition may appear rather encompassing, it discriminates against modes of 
governance, which used to dominate our understanding of politics for many generations and 
against which the research on (new modes of) governance emerged to begin with: 
government, command-and-control, state regulation, i.e. the hierarchical adoption and 
enforcement of political decision by state actors (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992; Rhodes, 1996; 
Pierre and Peters, 2000). It also excludes the lobbying and mere advocacy activities of non-
state actors aimed at governments as well as supranational and international organizations. 
They do not fulfil the coordination requirement. Finally, international diplomacy and inter-
state negotiation systems only qualify as new modes of governance to the extent that state use 
means other than international law coordinate their actions. 
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There is only limited evidence for the emergence of new modes of governance in the efforts of 
accession and neighbourhood countries to move closer to the EU and in the EU’s attempts to 
bring them closer to the acquis, respectively. This is even true if we further relax our definition 
and also consider modes in which non-state actors are not involved on equal footing 
(consultation, contracting-out).  
 
In Southern and Central Eastern European accession countries, traditional modes of 
governance have clearly dominated the approximation with the acquis communautaire. State 
actors have mostly relied on command and control regulation to adopt and adapt to EU 
policies. This is even true in the field of environment, where the costs of accession imposed an 
extraordinary financial and administrative burden already on the three Southern European 
countries that joined in the first half of the 1980s. Greece, Portugal and Spain had just 
completed their transition to democracy and seriously lagged behind in their socio-economic 
development. Given their limited capacities, they were unable to cope with the huge 
implementation load simply by hierarchically imposing the new environmental policies. 
About a decade later, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries found themselves in 
a similar situation when the EU opened accession negotiations. Yet, none of the Southern and 
CEE governments sought to enlist the help of non-state actors in coping with the challenge of 
accession. They did not try to share or shift the burden by, respectively, pooling resources and Working Paper No: 01/2011    Page 9 of 37 
delegating certain policy tasks to non-state actors. Likewise, civil society organizations and 
business did not use their expertise or money to gain systematic access to the policy process 
and influence the implementation of policies by which they were significantly affected. 
Consultation, outsourcing, and to a lesser extent voluntary agreements have been the only 
forms by which non-state actors have become involved. Thus, environmental organizations 
and research institutes have helped their governments to draw up inventories of protected 
species or lists of conservation areas as required under the Wild Bird and the Fauna-Flora-
Habitats Directives. Likewise, business has participated in the preparation of national 
guidance documents on standards for the Best Available Technology under the Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control Directive. Yet, NGOs have been able to yield greater 
influence on the implementation of EU policies by social mobilization and litigation against 
state authorities than by consulting or cooperating with them. Interestingly, such 
confrontational strategies may eventually lead to a greater involvement of the public since 
state actors seek the cooperation with civil society organizations in order to avoid litigation 
and/or to increase the legitimacy of unpopular political decisions (Koutalakis, 2009). Business 
seems to prefer hard regulation over more flexible modes of governance that would give them 
a greater role in implementation. State authorities, on their part, are equally reluctant to give 
non-state actors a role that goes beyond consultation or the selective contracting-out, even if 
environmental directives explicitly prescribe the participation of non-state actors (Buzogany, 
2009b; Guttenbrunner, 2009). In the Eastern neighbourhood countries, environmental non-
profit organisations also often lack the tradition of acting as civil society actors and demand a 
more assertive hierarchical approach by the governments (Lavenex, 2008;  Buzogany and 
Costa, 2009). 
 
The findings on environmental policy are corroborated in the field of social  policy. 
Concurring with the EU principle of social partnership, the CEE accession countries 
introduced tripartite negotiations between representatives of employers, employees and the 
government. Yet, attempts to institutionalize social dialogues have shown limited success. In 
Poland, the work of the Tripartite Commission has been repeatedly stalled by political conflict Working Paper No: 01/2011    Page 10 of 37 
and was circumvented by ad hoc consultations the Polish government launched. In Estonia, 
there has never been a permanent tripartite institution. Only the Lithuanian Tripartite 
Council appears to produce some policy outcomes. The inclusion of the social partners in 
management of implementing agencies, e.g. in the distribution of EU agricultural subsidies, 
has been equally disappointing (Grosse, 2007b, 2008b). 
 
In regional policy, by contrast, new modes of governance appear to play a more prominent 
role – although they are also firmly embedded in a hierarchical mode of governance. While 
the CEE central governments have been reluctant to share power with regional actors, the 
EU’s insistence on the principle of partnership combined with diverse pre-accession 
assistance programs empowering diverse subnational non-state actors spurred the emergence 
of more or less stable partnerships among various sub-national authorities, firms, and civil 
society organizations in the design and implementation of regional development programs. 
Such development partnerships take different forms and do not conform to a particular 
national model. What they have in common, though, is their “layering” – they all form part of 
a predominantly hierarchical and centralized governance regime that is characteristic for 
regional development policy in CEE accession countries (Bruszt, forthcomingb). 
 
We also find new modes of governance in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, an area close 
to the traditional realm of statehood. Here, limited competences of EU actors and the 
incapacity of the EU to tackle threats to internal security by hierarchical supranational means 
have spurred the emergence of horizontal forms of intensive transgovernmentalism or 
network governance that extends beyond the EU member states to associated countries in the 
EU’s neighbourhood (Lavenex and Wichmann, 2009). 
 
Finally, the emergence of new modes of governance in accession countries does not only vary 
across but also within policy sectors. Environmental organization, which are a national 
chapter of a transnational NGO (e.g. World Wildlife Foundation, Friends of the Earth) are 
much more inclined to cooperate with state authorities and business than local grass roots Working Paper No: 01/2011    Page 11 of 37 
groups. Likewise, in competitive and export-oriented companies, such as pharmaceuticals in 
Hungary or the construction industry in Romania, are more open to exchange their expertise 
for policy influence than structurally and financially weaker sectors, such as industrial 
farming, which not only have hardly any resources to offer but take no interest in improving 
implementation of costly environmental regulation (Buzogany, 2009a, 2009b). 
 
Such variations not withstanding, overall there is limited evidence for new modes of 
governance at the national level of accession and neighbourhood countries. Accession 
countries have witnessed at best the emergence of nascent forms of cooperation between state 
and non-state actors that hardly go beyond consultation – with the exception of regional 
development policy. Moreover, there are some signs for an increasing role of new modes of 
governance in the EU’s external relations. 
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3. WHY DO THEY (NOT) EMERGE? FACTORS FOSTERING AND 
HINDERING NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE 
There are several factors that have fostered and impaired the emergence of new modes of 
governance. They are located both at the European and the domestic level and impact upon 
the willingness and the capacity of state and non-state actors to engage in cooperation with 
each other. 
 
At the domestic level, weak state capacities have provided an important incentive for both 
state and non-state actors to cooperate. Approximation with EU Law requires immense 
resources, a demand that is hardly met by the weak governance capacities of the accession and 
neighbourhood countries. On the one hand, limited resources and problem-solving capacities 
may provide important incentives for state actors to resort to new modes of governance in an 
attempt to pool resources and share compliance costs. On the other hand, it is precisely the 
lack of resources that has impaired both the willingness and the capacity to cooperate of both 
state and non-state actors (cf. Börzel, 2009b). First, despite weak capacities, state actors still 
have an institutional self-interest in maintaining their political power. Thus, political parties 
in Poland impaired the introduction of new modes of governance aimed at increasing 
transparency, public participation and accountability of administrative agencies since it would 
reduce their political influence on the administration (Grosse, 2007b, 2008b;  Borrás, 
Koutalakis and Wendler, 2007). Similarly, in the field of regional policy making, central 
governments in the CEE countries were reluctant to involve non-state actors in decision-
making since it would reduce their control over the discretionary spending of EU moneys 
(Bruszt, forthcoming). 
 
Second, the top-down nature of the accession process, in which accession countries had to 
down-load of a vast number of EU laws in a relatively short time, has been counterproductive 
to the involvement of non-state actors, which is time-consuming and prone to deadlock or 
lowest common denominator solutions. Moreover, the strict application of conditionality by 
the Commission and its focus on the absorption capacity has increased the autonomy of Working Paper No: 01/2011    Page 13 of 37 
central governments and further induced the use of hierarchical modes of coordination 
(Buzogany, 2009a, 2009b; Guttenbrunner, 2009; Bruszt, forthcoming).  
 
Third, state actors have lacked the personnel, the level coordination between ministries and 
sub-national authorities, as well as the political skills to experiment with decentralized and 
inclusive modes of governance. The involvement of stake-holders in the implementation of 
environmental policies often failed because different parts of the administration hackled over 
competencies, particularly if a policy cuts across different portfolios, as in case of the Water 
Framework Directive or the social dialogue. Nor are state actors always capable of casting a 
credible shadow of hierarchy, which is a major incentive for non-state actors to get involved in 
public policy-making to avoid command-and-control regulation. Political instability and 
frequently changing governments further reduce their credibility as reliable negotiation 
partners, which was a major reason why civic dialogues failed in Poland (Grosse, 2006; 
Grosse, 2007a). Weak capacities do not only provide an incentive for state actors to seek the 
cooperation with non-state actors. They can also have the opposite effect. In case of the 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive, environmental authorities have often 
shied away from cooperating with companies since they were afraid of being captured given 
the superior knowledge, human resources and funding of firms and business associations 
(Guttenbrunner, forthcoming;  Koutalakis, 2008b) or have been, at  times, indeed been 
captured by powerful private interests as in case of the agency administering EU agricultural 
subsidies in Poland (Grosse, 2007b, 2008b). Finally, the engaging capacities of state actors 
have been severely hampered since institutionalized arenas for interacting with non-state 
actors have been largely absent. 
 
Fourth, non-state actors are not only reluctant to cooperate because they doubt that state 
actors are capable of translating mutual agreements into policy outcomes given weak 
enforcement powers, the still-unconsolidated regulatory framework, unstable majorities in 
parliaments and frequent government turn-over. Often, their capacities are equally wanting. 
Particularly civil society organizations do not have sufficient organizational capacities to offer Working Paper No: 01/2011    Page 14 of 37 
themselves as reliable partners to state actors. Or they lack resources to exchange to begin 
with. Social dialogue in Poland, Lithuania and Estonia suffers from the organizational 
weakness of trade unions, which are ridden by internal divisions and rivalry over dwindling 
members (Grosse, 2006). Business also appears to be rather weak, with regard to both their 
financial resources and organizational capacities.  
 
Yet, there is significant variation between sectors. Highly productive industries, which are 
usually strongly export-oriented and attract foreign direct investments, tend to posses relevant 
capacities, which are lacking, particularly with small and medium size enterprises. Thus, 
pharmaceutical companies in Hungary have had no difficulties in providing the technical 
expertise required to define Best Available Technology standards as demanded by the 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive. Since the application of the directive is 
necessary to ensure market access for some sectors, they also take an interest in fostering the 
regulatory capacity of states while  less competitive sectors continue to avoid compliance. 
Somewhat ironically, however, firms share the preference of state actors for command-and-
control regulation precisely because the monitoring and enforcement capacities of public 
authorities are weak as a result of which more flexible measures, such as voluntary agreements 
could give rise to legal uncertainty. As a result, Hungary, Poland and Greece apply even 
stricter standards than required by the EU (Buzogany, 2009a;  Guttenbrunner, 2009; 
Koutalakis, 2009). In Romania or Spain, by contrast, where the (full) privatization of industry 
in some sectors has lagged behind (e.g. power plants), state and business actors have worked 
together to avoid or at least postpone compliance with EU legislation (Buzogany, 2009b; Font 
and Fernandez, 2009). 
 
The impairing effect of weak governance capacities on the emergence of new modes of 
governance is reinforced by a state tradition which is hostile to the involvement of non-state 
actors in public policy-making. Not only are new modes of governance incompatible with the 
legacy of authoritarianism and socialism of most accession and neighbourhood countries. 
New modes of governance do not necessarily correspond to the newly established institutions Working Paper No: 01/2011    Page 15 of 37 
of representative democracies either. Thus, non-elected  interest groups and civil society 
organizations are not always accepted as legitimate representatives of societal interests. 
Moreover, their involvement in the policy process outside majoritarian institutions is often 
considered as a continuation of traditional clientelistic networks. This perception has been 
reinforced by attempts of the Polish politicians to use civil dialogue in order to circumvent 
opposition and deadlock in parliamentary or party arenas (Grosse, 2006;  Grosse, 2007a). 
Finally, the privatization of formerly public services, or their delegation to non-state actors, 
has met with strong opposition at the sub-national level, where local politicians and consumer 
groups have, for instance, resisted the involvement of private companies in the provision of 
drinking water (Guttenbrunner, 2009; Buzogany, 2009a). Likewise, the civil society tradition 
in the transition countries does not always resonate with new modes of governance either. 
Civil society largely emerged in opposition to the authoritarian state. Many civil society 
organizations still see themselves as “watchdogs” rather than partners of the state in public 
policy-making. Thus, environmental organizations often tend to pursue more confrontational 
strategies using public campaigns and litigation to exert pressure on public authorities 
(Buzogany, 2009a; Koutalakis, 2009). 
 
Domestic factors have largely impaired the emergence of new modes of governance in 
accession and neighbourhood countries. Europeanization, by contrast, has helped to 
overcome some of the obstacles. First, EU pressure induced state actors to resort to new 
modes of governance. On the one hand, the EU may legally require the involvement of private 
actors (e.g. the principle of partnership or participatory policy instruments in environmental 
Directives). Thus, it may be rational for state actors to apply new modes of governance in 
order to gain access to EU funding or avoid negative consequences, such as delays in the 
accession process (accession conditionality) or infringement proceedings. This may largely 
explain why new modes of governance are more prevalent in regional policy than in other 
areas. EU requirements for new modes of governance are most explicit in the principle of 
partnership, which the Commission introduced in the 1980s to open-up the bilateral relations 
between the national governments and their regions at the domestic level seeking to turn Working Paper No: 01/2011    Page 16 of 37 
structural policy into a process of multilevel co-operative policy-making (Ansell, Parsons and 
Darden, 1997, Bache, 1998, Heinelt and Smith, 1996, Hooghe, 1996). The emphasis of the 
Commission on the absorption capacity of accession countries may have strengthened the role 
of central government rather than decentralized policy-making powers to the regional and 
local levels. But while the EU gave central states the prerogative to control regional policy-
making, its assistance programmes led to the creation of new actors that used the 
opportunities offered by the partnership principle and formed development partnerships, 
particularly after accession when the Commission lapsed back to its original preference for 
more decentralized structures in structural policy. Moreover, societal actors and sub-national 
authorities could politicize issues of territorial decentralization and exert pressure on state 
reforms towards greater devolution of power (Bruszt, forthcoming). In a similar vein, the legal 
prescriptions for public involvement of the Fauna, Flora, Habitat or the Water Framework 
Directive empowered environmental organizations in the policy process. They could either 
exert pressure on public authorities by taking them to court and or lodge a complaint to the 
European Commission, respectively, as Polish, Spanish and Greek NGOs successfully did 
(Guttenbrunner, 2009; Font and Fernandez, 2009; Koutalakis, 2004). Or state actors seek to 
involve societal actors to avoid litigation and help avoid conflict with other stakeholders, 
respectively, as Greek authorities to facilitate the implementation of the FFH Directive 
(Koutalakis, 2009). 
 
Second, the EU does not only provide incentives and governance paradigms that may favour 
NMG. It also helps strengthening governance capacities of accession countries. The transfer of 
money and expertise through Community programs and twinning processes provides state as 
well as non-state actors with additional resources they can exchange. The participation in EU 
pre-accession programmes in the 1990s has strengthened the capacities of municipalities, 
firms, NGOs and universities to participate in national and regional development 
programmes after accession (Bruszt and Vedres, 2008). Likewise, transnational regulatory 
networks, such as Pan-European Regulatory Forum in pharmaceuticals, the “Seville Process” 
under the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive or the Network for the Working Paper No: 01/2011    Page 17 of 37 
Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law, have fostered the building-up of 
technical knowledge as well as trust among regulatory authorities, firms and consumer and 
health organizations from accession countries (Koutalakis, 2008b; Koutalakis, 2008a; Font and 
Fernandez, 2009; Fernández and Font, 2009). 
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4. EXECUTING NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE: HIERARCHY IN 
DISGUISE 
The approximation of accession countries to EU Law appears to be largely governed by 
traditional modes of governance, in which central states predominantly uses hierarchical 
coordination to adopt and adapt to the acquis communautaire. They legally oblige the rule 
targets to comply. Not surprisingly, new modes of governance play a more prominent role in 
the EU’s attempts to move accession and neighbourhood closer to European standards. Thus, 
in the EU’s relation with associated neighbourhood states, transgovernmental networks and 
networks of regulators have emerged, which are partly organized around European agencies. 
This is particularly the case in more technocratic and depoliticized policy areas, such as 
pharmaceutical and environmental regulation or research. Legal harmonization of 
pharmaceutical regulation in CEE accession countries with the EU could only be achieved 
with the help of two regulatory networks, the Pan-European Regulatory Forum and the 
Collaborative Agreement between Drug Regulatory Authorities in the European Union 
Associated Countries. Both initiatives were facilitated by the European Agency for the 
Evaluation of Medicinal Products. The transnational networks have brought together national 
and European regulators with industry representatives facilitating processes of “horizontal 
regulatory learning” about which EU standards had to be uniformly implemented and which 
parts would allow for some flexibility (Koutalakis and Prange, 2006; Koutalakis, 2008b; ). We 
find similar examples of regulatory alignment through transgovernmental and transnational 
networks in the European Neighbourhood Policy, e.g. in the implementation of the EU Water 
Framework Directive at the regional level of transnational water basins, Israel’s full 
association to the EU’s Research Framework Programme, or the membership of Eastern 
neighbourhood countries in relevant regulatory fora dealing with aviation security (Lavenex, 
Lehmkuhl and Wichmann, 2007; Lavenex, 2008; Lavenex, Lehmkuhl and Wichmann, 2009). 
Such transgovernmental networks have even emerged in more sensitive areas of Justice and 
Home Affairs cooperation between the EU and ENP countries, however not without 
hegemonic traits (Lavenex and Wichmann, 2009). 
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In the shadow of EU Treaty law on the free movement of goods and services and on state aid 
control, some new modes of governance emerged that are often overlooked. The principle of 
mutual recognition in services and state aid soft law have helped an increasingly 
heterogeneous EU to make its policies work in situations, in which old and new member 
states have not been able to agree upon further integration. In the field of EU state aid control, 
a major revision of regional aid became necessary due to enlargement and the increased 
disparities in the EU-27. Soft law facilitated the adaptations (Blauberger, 2008). Regarding the 
trade in services, the Bolkenstein Directive of 2004 is an attempt to use mutual recognition 
where the increasing wage differential between the old member states and the CEE accession 
countries created a major growth potential but member states were unable to agree on a 
harmonization of service regulation. While political opposition reduced the scope of the 
service directive, service providers will be regulated in one member states, supplying their 
services in others (Schmidt and Nicolaïdis, 2007). Allowing services trade in the absence of 
harmonized services regulation, mutual recognition relies on binding administrative 
cooperation. In this way, national administrations become responsible to transnational and 
European demands, which results in the harmonization of administrative cooperation 
(Schmidt, 2008b).  
 
New modes of governance also combine with old modes of governance in the EU’s external 
relations, where transgovernmental networks often occur in conjunction with both hegemony 
and intergovernmental cooperation. In relation with neighbourhood countries, this is the case 
both when third countries lack the governance capacity to act as equal partners in EU-
sponsored networks, such as in the case of environmental policy, and when EU actors try to 
mobilise more horizontal modes of governance as a means to compensate for the incapacity to 
act hierarchically, such as in Justice and Home Affairs (Lavenex, 2008; Lavenex, Lehmkuhl 
and Wichmann, 2009). The result is often a “layering” (Bruszt, forthcoming), where new 
modes of governance are introduced without basically challenging or altering the dominant 
features of the traditional structures and processes. 
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In sum, new modes of governance are not only scattered, unstable and cannot be regarded as 
typical for accession countries. They are usually embedded in old modes. The shadow of 
hierarchy often looms in the background giving rise to asymmetrical cooperation or 
“hierarchy in disguise” (Bruszt, forthcoming). 
 
5. THE EVOLUTION OF NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE: FOSTERING 
NEW THROUGH OLD MODES OF GOVERNANCE 
While weak capacities of state and non-state actors have largely prevented the emergence of 
new modes of governance, old modes of governance have helped accession countries to escape 
the “low equilibrium trap” (Bruszt, forthcoming), both in the South and in the East of Europe 
(cf. Börzel, 2009a).  
 
First, the adoption of the acquis communautaire  has opened possibilities to denounce 
violations of EU law to the Commission, bring legal cases before national courts and mobilize 
the public (Börzel, 2006). At the same time, several EU policies explicitly prescribe public 
participation, acces to information and transparency. 
 
Second, when the accession process has started, EU-pre-accession funding schemes became 
available. The tailor-made assistance by PHARE, ISPA or SAPARD funding provided direct 
technical assistance and technological know-how for both state and non-state actors  
 
Third, the accession process has provided NGOs and business with connections to like-
minded organizations in the old member states as well as interest groups and transnational 
networks active at the EU-level.  
 
It is too early to systematically trace the effects of the opportunity structure provided by EU 
old modes of governance (regulation, litigation, capacity-building) in the CEE countries. But 
we have observed some interesting changes in the three Southern European states, which 
joined already in the 1980s. Spain and Portugal have seen some first inceptions of new modes Working Paper No: 01/2011    Page 21 of 37 
of governance in the years after accession. Particularly in the areas of nature protection, water 
management and air pollution, where the EU increasingly relies on procedural framework 
legislation that seeks to integrate different media (water, air, soil, noise) and explicitly 
prescribes public involvement, environmental groups, scientific experts and business have 
started to play a more prominent role in the implementation process, which goes beyond 
consultation and contracting-out (Font and Fernandez, 2009;  Fernández and Font, 2009; 
Koutalakis, 2009). 
 
However, the building of governance capacities has been unequal, favouring state over non-
state actors. While state actors have become more open to the involvement of non-state 
actors, they have managed to stay in control of the policy process. The asymmetrical 
relationship explains why we only find weak forms of new modes of governance, which largely 
operate under the shadow of hierarchy or form “hierarchies in disguise” (see above).  
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6. EVALUATING NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE 
6.1. Handle with care: The (effect)iveness of new modes of governance 
 To make policies work, state actors become increasingly dependent upon the cooperation and 
joint resource mobilization of non-state actors, which are outside their hierarchical control. 
New modes of governance allow state actors tap into the resources of non-state actors and 
facilitate their participation in the policy process as to ensure effective implementation. The 
more the actors affected by a policy have a say in decision-making, the more likely they are to 
accept the policy outcome to be implemented, even if their interests may not have been fully 
accommodated. In short, new modes of governance can significantly strengthen the capacity 
of state actors in public policy-making (cf. Héritier, 2003). If they emerge, we may expect 
them to improve the effective approximation of accession and neighbourhood countries to the 
EU. 
 
There are, however, reasons to doubt that there is necessarily a positive effect of new modes of 
governance on effectiveness. Non-state  actors can certainly provide public actors with 
important resources to make public policies work. However, it is unclear whether the mutual 
resource dependency of state and non-state actors actually leads to a net increase in the 
problem-solving capacity of new modes of governance. If states are so weak that they have to 
share authority with non-state actors, this can easily result in problem-shifting or agency 
capture (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000). In some cases, new modes of governance 
arrangements could simply be neoliberal solutions in disguise; that is, they amount to the 
privatization and de-regulation of formerly public services rather than the adoption of 
effective public policies. This explains at least party why attempts of accession countries to 
involve private companies in the provision of drinking water have met with fierce resistance at 
the local level. Why private capital is badly needed particularly by smaller municipalities to 
meet the quality standards of the EU Drinking Water Directive, public pressure has prevented 
comprehensive privatization (see above). 
 Working Paper No: 01/2011    Page 23 of 37 
Moreover, states with weak regulatory capacities may not have the ability to reassume 
responsibility for delegated tasks in cases of private failures as functions were delegated 
because they were not capable of delivering them in the first place. Likewise, weak state actors 
may not be able to resist the pressure of non-state actors to adopt policies that are serving the 
public interest, or, worse, are not able to judge what policies may be in the public interest 
since they lack the necessary information and expertise. Finally, the inclusion of non-state 
actors as the primary rule-targets in the process of rule-making can certainly increase the 
problem-solving capacity by ensuring compliance. Yet, including non-state rule targets in 
public policy-making might simply lead to “lowest common denominator” solutions or even 
result in deadlock. If those who have to bear the costs of compliance are involved in the 
negotiating process, they may attempt to weaken rules and regulations or prevent them 
altogether (Héritier 2003). 
 
The empirical findings on the effect of new modes of governance on bringing accession and 
neighbourhood countries closer to the acquis are as mixed as the arguments found in the 
governance literature. New modes of governance may indeed promote the timely, complete 
and correct adoption of and adaptation to EU policies in accession and neighbourhood 
countries. Thus, the implementation of such complex regulations as the Water Framework, 
the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, or the Fauna, Flora, Habitats Directives 
greatly benefitted from the expertise provided by environmental organizations, scientific 
experts and business (Börzel, 2009a). They helped state actors to reduce compliance costs and 
to resolve conflicts among actors involved. Likewise, the delegation of pre-accession 
preparations to the Pan-European Regulatory Forum proved more effective in “smoothening” 
the harmonization of pharmaceutical regulations in CEE accession countries with EU 
requirements than the traditional mode of bilateral negotiations between the Commission and 
central governments. The participatory regulatory network has significantly reduced the 
demand of CEE accession countries for derogations in the pharmaceutical area and has 
contributed to a smooth transition to the new regulatory regime. This is in sharp contrast to Working Paper No: 01/2011    Page 24 of 37 
the environmental acquis, where no such NMG emerged (Koutalakis and Prange, 2006; 
Borrás, Koutalakis and Wendler, 2007). 
 
In regional policy, development partnerships at the sub-national level have helped improve 
the absorption capacity of CEE countries by mobilizing information and resources otherwise 
not available, discovering new options, and improving local acceptance of governance 
policies. The cross-sectoral cooperation of state and non-state actors at the sub-national level 
encouraged the creation of encompassing and inclusive development programmes by 
institutionalizing multi-stakeholder deliberations on the goals of development and the best 
ways to achieve them. Typical examples would be local developmental associations among 
municipalities, firms and NGOs in Hungary that have helped micro-regions with weak and 
fragmented local state to mobilize resources for integrated developmental programs (Keller, 
2008). Likewise, the inclusion of the social partners in the distribution of EU agricultural 
subsidies was instrumental in improving the absorption capacity of EU Funding in Poland by 
disseminating information and raising social acceptance of EU policies (Grosse, 2007b).  
 
At the EU level, the principle of mutual recognition has achieved approximation without 
resorting to harmonization, which may be unfeasible since the member states are unable to 
agree on common rules and standards. In the case of services trade, it was the only way to 
advance integration without harmonizing regulation of services in the old and new member 
states. Given the significant wage differences present in the enlarged EU, the services directive 
roused hitherto unknown protests. The compromise therefore deleted any references to 
home-country rule. Nevertheless, as Article 16 prohibits member states to neither require 
from service providers authorization, registration, identification, specific tools or materials, 
nor prescribe distinct contract relations if this hampers the provision of services, mutual 
recognition enters through the back door (Schmidt, 2008a). Likewise, soft law in state aid 
helped to improve the timeliness, legal certainty and transparency of Commission control, 
particularly in the CEE accession countries, which had to substantially adapt their state aid 
policies to EU law. Since accession, they have indeed effectively converged towards the EU-15 Working Paper No: 01/2011    Page 25 of 37 
average (Blauberger, 2008). Overall, new modes of governance have helped to preserve the 
unity of European Law despite the increased heterogeneity of the member states, which might 
have required more flexible interpretations of European law to adapt it to a different 
environment. 
 
All in all, new modes of governance do contribute to the effective approximation to the EU – 
if they emerge in the first place. However, they can also have the opposite effect e.g. by 
delaying the implementation and application of EU policies. CEE governments have often 
circumvented social dialogue because the long lasting debates in the tripartite commissions 
threatened the timely adoption of EU social policies (Grosse, 2006). In a similar vein, the 
requirements for the introduction of new modes of governance, such as public involvement in 
water management, nature conservation or pollution prevention and control, are often not 
easy to handle for state actors in accession countries, who lack both the administrative 
capacities and the experience to cooperate with multiple stakeholders and accommodate their 
conflicting interests. While helping to foster the effective adoption of and adaptation to EU 
environmental policies, new modes of governance have at times created additional problems 
(Börzel, 2009a). For instance, the selective inclusion of environmental organizations and 
consulting companies into the NATURA 2000 processes in Hungary has left other affected 
stakeholders, such as farmers or private forest owners outside the policy-cycle and diminished 
the overall legitimacy of the state’s nature conservation efforts (Buzogany, 2009a). 
  
Like their emergence, the effectiveness of new modes of governance may depend on certain 
scope conditions at least partly related to the governance capacities of state and non-state 
actors. The shadow of hierarchy provides important incentives to non-state actors not only to 
get but also to stay involved in regulatory networks and comply with their outcomes, e.g. by 
mitigating compliance costs and enforcing agreements. In stark contrast to the Polish case, 
Hungarian state actors were much more successful to mobilize private cognitive resources 
towards pharmaceutical harmonization through the institutionalization of credible 
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interactions with the industry (Koutalakis, 2008a). At the same time, non-state actors require 
sufficient capacities to make use of the opportunities offered by new modes of governance. 
The social partners in Estonia and Poland are too weak and divided to negotiate agreements 
(Grosse, 2007a, Grosse, 2006). Particularly local NGOs suffer from similar problems in 
sustaining their participation in the management of nature protection areas (Koutalakis, 
forthcoming; Guttenbrunner, forthcoming). And sub-national actors lack the capacities to 
make effective demands on the central state for a broader participation in regional 
development programmes (Bruszt, 2002; Bruszt, forthcoming). 
 
Finally, new modes of governance may improve effectiveness, but this may come at some costs 
with regard to legitimacy. While NMG may increase the acceptance of a policy by involving 
affected parties and mediating conflicts of interest, they can also generate opposition and 
resentment. Because of their non-majoritarian character, new modes of governance are often 
seen as clientelistic, intransparent, exclusive, and, thus, undemocratic. Social dialogue, for 
instance, has given some of the social partners the opportunity to establish informal relation 
with decision-makers and influence public policy in accordance to particularistic social 
interests (Grosse, 2006; Grosse, 2007a).  
 
In the context of EU Treaty law, mutual recognition and state aid soft law have increased 
output-legitimacy in terms of overall European levels of trade and competition. This may, 
however, look different from the perspective of individual member states. In concrete cases, 
market freedoms and state aid control do not only lead to overall efficiency gains but also 
involve redistributive issues, thus, creating winners and losers. From the latter’s point of view, 
not only output-legitimacy is lacking – it is also not compensated for by means of input-
oriented legitimization. In the case of mutual recognition, legitimacy problems arise as a result 
of the horizontal transfer of power . While mutual recognition may allow services trade 
despite the absence of harmonized services regulation, it deprives member states from the 
possibility of conducting controls of goods and services produced and provided by another 
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for the quality of the goods and the services because they are not subject to its regulations. Nor 
have consumers in the country of destination the possibility to hold the government of the 
country of origin accountable (Nicolaidis, 1997). Moreover, mutual recognition relies on 
binding administrative cooperation. In this way, national administrations become responsible 
also to transnational and European demands, and are partly detached from their exclusively 
national political responsibility (Schmidt, 2008b). At the same time, member states are much 
more flexible when regulating than under the Community Method, so one could argue that 
mutual recognition facilitates democratic self-determination and reduces the legitimacy 
deficit of national decision-making, which produces externalities for other member states, by 
forcing countries to take these interests into account (Schmidt, 2007). In state aid, problems of 
legitimacy mostly arise at the EU level, where the Commission takes decisions largely free 
from control by the Parliament or the Council, although they often involve important 
redistributive issues. Moreover, the progressive development of state aid soft law privileges 
certain potential state aid beneficiaries over others. As to the new member states, the 
constraints of European state aid control are sometimes characterized as being inadequately 
strict with regard to the restructuring of firms in critical sectors. In contrast, the 
Commission’s reformulation of regional aid rules leads to a decreasing ability of the older 
Member states to assist their underdeveloped regions by means of state aid (Blauberger, 2008). 
 
In sum, new modes of governance can help smoothen the approximation to the EU and 
render it socially more acceptable. However, they can also create additional problems of both 
effectiveness and legitimacy. We need to carefully study the scope conditions under which 
new modes of governance impact upon the working of public policies at the domestic and the 
European level. Governance capacities appear as key not only for the emergence but also for 
the effect(iveness) of new modes of governance.  
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6.2.  Cui bono? The structural impact of new modes of governance 
Tracing the structural impact of new modes of governance on power relations is difficult since 
it is hard to isolate their effect. Not only are new modes of governance limited in number, 
their emergence coincides with other changes induced by accession to and approximation 
with the EU. Moreover, for Southern, Central and Eastern European countries, accession to 
the EU has overlapped with their still ongoing political and socio-economic transition. The 
same is true for the neighbourhood countries of the Former Soviet Union. 
 
Due to their inclusiveness, we might expect new modes of governance to strengthen civil 
society and the participation of a greater number and variety of state and non-state actors 
more generally speaking. Yet, there is little evidence that new modes of governance have 
changed the societal structures in accession and neighbourhood countries. Part of the reason 
certainly lies with their scarce emergence (see above). But even where they have emerged, the 
impact of new modes of governance on (domestic) power relations is at best differential. They 
may empower non-state actors and local authorities vis-à-vis their central governments by 
legally prescribing public involvement in the policy process and opening new legal and 
political venues to push their interests, e.g. by taking their case to court and lodging 
complaints with the European Commission. But non-state actors have often been too weak to 
exploit these new opportunities. Thus, accession to the EU has provided environmental actors 
with opportunities to put pressure on their national governments by lodging complaints with 
the European Commission in cases of non-compliance with EU environmental law (mostly in 
Southern Europe) or EU institutional requirements during the accession period (in Central 
and Eastern Europe). Yet, in all six countries, non-state actors have initially been too weak to 
systematically exert pressure on their governments and to engage in stable and sustainable 
cooperation, respectively, to make EU policies work on the grounds. Spanish and Hungarian 
environmental groups, often supported by transnational organizations, have been more 
successful in using the participatory prescriptions of the Environmental Impact Assessment, 
the Water Framework, and the Fauna, Flora, Habitats Directive (Buzogany, 2009a; Font and 
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mobilization in Greece and Romania is much more localized (Koutalakis, 2009; Buzogany, 
2009b). They were often not willing either (see emergence).  
 
The role of civil society in CEE accession countries resembled the situation in the three 
Southern European countries during the pre- and immediate post-accession period in the 
1980s (cf. Börzel, 2010). Next to capacity constraints, environmental groups still have to find 
their final place in public policy-making. Pooling resources with the state requires a 
cooperative attitude, which conflicts with the role of civil society as a major opposition against 
socialist repression. Like in  Southern Europe, many non-governmental organizations see 
themselves as independent watchdogs rather than partners of government (Börzel and 
Buzogany, 2010; Koutalakis, 2004). 
 
In the field of regional policy, the partnership principle and EU conditionality have 
empowered sub-national actors and NGOs in accession countries to make effective demands 
for their inclusion in the preparation and implementation of regional development 
programmes. Yet, their structural impact has been limited since they are embedded in 
predominantly hierarchical governance structures as a result of which they do not offer 
sufficient incentives and resources to foster horizontal cooperation and power sharing in the 
distribution of structural funds. Rather, the shadow of hierarchy induces regional actors to 
build-up vertical relations. As a result, the “layering” of new modes of governance has only 
induced slow change on the margins and mostly contributes to the reinforcement of 
hierarchical modes of governance (Bruszt, forthcoming). Likewise, the introduction of social 
dialogue institutions in Poland, Estonia and Lithuania has done little to transform the socialist 
legacy of the administrative state towards a more “Western-type” network model. On the 
contrary, new modes of governance have reinforced some of the pathologies of these states by 
undermining “classical” modes of democratic legitimating allowing state actors to circumvent 
majoritarian institutions by resorting to civil or social dialogue (Grosse, 2007a, Grosse, 2006). 
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Overall, new modes of governance have reinforced rather than changed existing domestic 
structures, particularly with regard to the dominance of executive actors at the national but 
also at the EU level (Grosse, 2007b). While new modes of governance may have helped to get 
accession countries out of the “low capacity trap” characterized by weak states and weak 
societies (Sissenich, 2007), they have moved toward a situation of “stronger societies but much 
stronger states” (Bruszt, 2008a). These asymmetrical power constellations are hardly 
conducive to the full fledged evolution of new modes of governance. 
 
The structural impact of new modes of governance has not only been limited due to weak 
governance capacities, particularly of non-state actors, and the low resonance with the 
administrative and civic culture in the accession countries. The EU often does not exert 
sufficient pressure for adaptation, since its own institutions are too weak, as in case of social 
dialogue or the introduction of social and local partnership in executive agencies 
administering EU agricultural funds (Grosse, 2006, 2007b), or its policies are inconsistent 
oscillating between encouraging the sharing and the concentration of central state powers as 
they have done in structural policy (Bruszt, forthcoming). The EU has also started to turn 
away from attempts to directly interfere with the domestic institutions of its member states, 
emphasizing competition and subsidiary (Grosse, 2008a: chapter 5). Yet, the principle of 
mutual recognition is an interesting example for a new mode of governance having an indirect 
effect on the domestic (administrative) structures of accession countries. While not making 
any specific prescriptions, national administrations are obliged to cooperate in order to assist 
each other in implementing the Service Directive. This may result in a harmonization of 
administrative laws of member states. Moreover, it constitutes a significant break with the 
past principle that member states were to implement EU directives free from any interference 
from the EU and other member states (Schmidt, 2008b).  
 
Finally, since new and old modes usually work in combination (see previous section), new 
modes complement old modes and (partly) compensate for their weaknesses. By increasing 
both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of hierarchical modes, they sustain rather than Working Paper No: 01/2011    Page 31 of 37 
change traditional governance regimes, which severely limits the structural impact of new 
modes. So far, new modes of governance have done little to transform the state. On the 
contrary, they may have reinforced some of the pathologies of accession countries.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS: MUCH ADO ABOUT ALMOST NOTHING? 
New modes of governance have started to travel East. Both the EU and accession and 
neighbourhood countries have resorted to non-hierarchical forms of coordination and the 
involvement of non-state actors to foster approximation with the acquis communautaire. 
However, new modes of governance have not played the prominent role which the weak 
capacities of accession and neighbourhood countries would lead us to expect. Their 
emergence is scattered and varies significantly. Where they emerged, new modes of 
governance hardly go beyond consultation and contracting-out and are only weakly 
institutionalized. If non-state actors are more directly involved in the policy process, their 
relations with state actors tend to be asymmetrical and at times merely disguise and legitimize 
hierarchical modes. While state actors may be weak, non-state actors are even weaker. 
 
These findings have important implications for both theory and practical application of (new 
modes of) governance. If it is correct that non-hierarchical modes of governance require both 
a strong state and a strong society, this results in a serious dilemma or even paradox (cf. 
Börzel, 2009b): the lower the capacity of a state, the greater the need for new modes of 
governance to compensate for state weakness – but the less likely they are to emerge. This is 
particularly true if there is indeed a dialectical relationship between the evolution of a strong 
state and a strong society as implicitly assumed or explicitly claimed by the governance 
literature (for an overview of the literature Börzel, 2007a). 
 
However, there are ways out of the low capacity trap. First, EU pressure is a prominent factor 
in inducing state actors to resort to new modes of governance. On the one hand, the EU may 
legally require the involvement of private actors. On the other hand, there is a normative logic 
that may drive the emergence of new modes of governance – it is the “EU way of doing 
business”. Second, the EU also helps strengthening governance capacities of accession and 
neighbourhood countries. The transfer of money and expertise through Community 
programs and twinning processes provides state as well as non-state actors with additional 
resources they can ex-change. Given the asymmetrical power relations of weak states but even Working Paper No: 01/2011    Page 33 of 37 
weaker societies, capacity-building by the EU should, however, focus much more on 
strengthening non-state actors. EU resource transfer also fosters policy learning and trust 
building. Finally, the monitoring and sanctioning system of the EU has empowered non-state 
actors by opening new opportunities for them to pursue their interests, e.g. by taking their 
governments to court. State actors may resort to new modes of governance in order to 
accommodate the interests of non-state actors and avoid complaints to the Commission or 
legal proceedings.  
 
The EU’s governance mix of conditionality, assistance and political dialogue provides an 
opportunity structure for the emergence and evolution of new modes of governance. Still, we 
need to mute high-flying expectations regarding their role in drawing countries closer to the 
EU. Both the EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood policies have to deal with countries which 
typically have both weak states and weak societies. While capacity-building plays a prominent 
role in the EU’s governance export, it takes time as the example of the Southern European 
countries shows.  
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